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FUNDING FAVORED SONS AND DAUGHTERS: NONPROSECUTION 
AGREEMENTS AND “EXTRAORDINARY RESTITUTION” IN 
ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMINAL CASES
by Paul J. Larkin, Jr.  ................................................................................ 1 
Over the past eight years, the federal government has entered into more 
than two hundred nonprosecution agreements with corporations in 
white-collar crime cases. In such agreements the government promises 
to cease its investigation and forego any potential charges so long as the 
corporation agrees to certain terms. And there’s the rub: given the 
economic realities of just being charged with a white-collar crime these 
days, corporations are more than willing to accept nonprosecution 
agreements. Prosecutors are cognizant of this willingness, as well as of 
the fact that these agreements are practically insulated from judicial 
review. This results in the prosecution possessing a seemingly 
unfettered discretion in choosing the terms of a nonprosecution 
agreement. The breadth of this discretion is nowhere more apparent 
than in environmental criminal cases. Nonprosecution agreements in 
such cases have begun to require corporations to donate monetarily to a 
nonprofit of the government’s choosing. Indeed, in 2012 British 
Petroleum agreed to pay more than $2.394 billion to nonprofit agencies. 
This Article critiques this practice by highlighting the inconsistencies 
between nonprosecution agreements and plea bargaining—the latter are 
subject to judicial review while the former are not—and unearthing the 
differences between these payments and any common-law 
understanding of restitutionary principles. The Article then suggests that 
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the practical result of these nonprosecution agreements is that 
prosecutors are diverting money that ought to be paid to the Treasury to 
government-chosen nonprofit agencies, a power constitutionally granted 
to legislative actors. Finally, the Article concludes by suggesting a 
modest reform: judicial review by a United States magistrate judge, so 
as not to run into any Article III concerns, to ensure that prosecutors do 
not take advantage of the nonprosecution-agreement process.  
EAGLES, INDIAN TRIBES, AND THE FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION
by Kathryn E. Kovacs  ............................................................................. 53 
The Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act prohibits the taking or 
possession of eagles and eagle parts. Recognizing the centrality of 
eagles in many Native American religions, Congress carved out an 
exception to that prohibition for “the religious purposes of Indian 
tribes.” The problems with the administration of that exception are 
reaching crisis proportions. At the Fish and Wildlife Service’s National 
Eagle Repository, which collects dead eagles from around the country 
and distributes them to members of federally recognized Indian tribes, 
more than six thousand tribal members are on a waiting list for eagles. 
That list grows each year. Frustration with the current system feeds a 
burgeoning black market that threatens the viability of eagle 
populations. Neither of the Eagle Act’s goals is being met: eagles are 
not adequately protected, and tribal religious needs are not satisfied. 
     Scholarship in this area has neither fully elucidated the cross-cutting 
tensions in the administration of the Eagle Act nor prescribed a realistic 
solution. This Article fills that gap. First, the Article examines a series 
of tensions: between species preservation and religious freedom; 
between accommodating the religious needs of tribal members and not 
accommodating others with the same religious needs; within the case 
law itself; and between the government’s effort to accommodate tribal 
religion and the deep dissatisfaction of the tribal community. This 
Article then proposes a solution: changing the Fish and Wildlife 
Service’s administration of the exception from permitting individuals to 
permitting tribes and ultimately turning over much of the administration 
of the Indian tribes exception to the tribes acting collectively. The 
Article explains how scholarship on indigenous cultural property, 
community property solutions to the tragedy of the commons, and tribal 
self-determination supports this proposal. Finally, the Article shows 
how this proposal will alleviate some of the tension in the 
administration of the Eagle Act’s Indian tribes exception.
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THE MYRIAD REASONS TO HIT “RESET” ON PATENT-ELIGIBILITY 
JURISPRUDENCE
by Alan J. Heinrich & Christopher T. Abernethy .................................. 117 
This Article explores the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Association 
for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc. in the historical context 
of the Court’s jurisprudence regarding the scope of patent-eligible subject 
matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101, including the broad, judicially created 
“exceptions” to the statute which exclude “laws of nature, physical 
phenomena, and abstract ideas” from patent eligibility. The authors posit 
that the Myriad decision was a significant departure from the Court’s prior 
jurisprudence regarding patent-eligible subject matter. The authors 
welcome this departure and contend that Myriad more accurately adhered 
to the letter and the spirit of § 101 than did many of the Court’s prior 
rulings. The authors further propose that Myriad’s bright-line test for patent 
eligibility can provide a foundation for a clear and workable framework, 
grounded firmly in statute, that would at last bring order and consistency to 
an area of patent law that has long been riddled with confusion and 
uncertainty.  
A RIGHT TO REMAIN PSYCHOTIC? A NEW STANDARD FOR INVOLUNTARY 
TREATMENT IN LIGHT OF CURRENT SCIENCE
by Elizabeth Bennion  ............................................................................ 251 
Mass shootings, such as the killing of school children and staff in 
Newtown, Connecticut, have provided brutal reminders of inadequacies 
in our nation’s mental health system. In the wake of these shootings, 
President Obama asserted that “[w]e are going to need to work on 
making access to mental health care as easy as access to a gun.” But 
what should society do when the person needing mental health 
treatment refuses care—when the problem is not rooted in access but in 
free will? When is involuntary treatment justified? In deciding whether 
to forcibly medicate, multiple interests come into play, including patient 
autonomy, public safety, and the patient’s medical welfare. As a 
society, we have overemphasized patient autonomy and 
underemphasized patient welfare to the detriment not only of the 
patient’s well-being but also of public safety—and even to the 
detriment of patient autonomy itself. This Article briefly examines the 
history of the involuntary treatment debate and how society arrived at 
the present imbalance. It then considers the implications of current 
scientific research on the brain and the nature of severe mental illness, 
using schizophrenia as an illustrative example. The Article explains 
how current involuntary treatment standards could be revised to reflect 
this scientific understanding and continue protecting a patient’s civil 
rights without making undue sacrifices of the patient’s long-term health 
and well-being. It also defends the proposed new standard against 
potential constitutional challenges. 
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     The new standard would allow involuntary treatment for a limited 
number of years after onset of severe psychotic symptoms under 
specified conditions. It would also provide for more access to medical 
information by patients’ immediate family members and primary 
caretakers. The standard reflects (1) research showing the vital 
importance of early treatment for long-term prognosis and prevention of 
irreversible injury to the brain; (2) statistics suggesting the particular 
vulnerability of a maturing brain; (3) a respect for autonomy and the 
patient’s ultimate agency to reject treatment if no satisfactory treatment 
option can be found; (4) consideration of factors that uniquely affect 
autonomy concerns when patients are severely psychotic; and (5) 
research demonstrating that family involvement can greatly benefit 
treatment outcomes. Because brain science is currently an area of 
explosive growth and discovery, this Article recognizes that any 
involuntary treatment standard will need to be continually re-examined 
and revised in light of scientific progress.
NOTES
WHAT’S IN A NAME? A CASE FOR INCLUDING BIOMETRIC IDENTIFIERS ON 
ARREST WARRANTS
by Ryan Webb ........................................................................................ 319
Too often, innocent individuals sharing the same name and physical 
characteristics as the subject of an arrest warrant are misidentified and 
mistakenly held by law enforcement. The use of biometric identifiers, 
commonly known as fingerprint identification numbers, would help 
reduce the number of false arrests because a person’s fingerprints are 
entirely unique to that individual. Hearkening back to 1894, the 
Supreme Court’s prevailing interpretation of the particularity 
requirement of arrest warrants mandates only that the warrant include a 
subject’s name or general physical description. With such a low 
threshold to establish a facially valid warrant, law enforcement officers 
are essentially immunized from civil liability and mistakenly arrested 
individuals are without legal recourse. Such consequences do not accord 
with the Fourth Amendment’s “right of the people to be secure in their 
persons.” This Note argues that biometric identifiers, which have been 
used in law enforcement and have the ability to singularly identify the 
actual subject of an arrest warrant, should be included on arrest 
warrants. This embellishment of the “particularity” standard faithfully 
accords with the guarantees of the Fourth Amendment and would 
advance the rights of individuals who are wrongly arrested.
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THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT’S UNBOUNDED CONCEPTION OF INHERENCY IN 
PATENT LAW
by Matthew Kaiser ................................................................................ 345 
This Note examines the doctrine of inherency in patent law, which 
relates to the Patent Act’s novelty requirement, and—theoretically—
seeks to ensure that inventions that are already within the public domain 
are not wrenched away from the public through a later patent grant. 
Unfortunately, a lack of recent Supreme Court guidance and a conflict 
within the Federal Circuit concerning what is necessary to prove 
inherency have led to a confusing and unpredictable body of inherency 
law. This Note begins by outlining the increased concern for uniformity 
and predictability in patent law; it then traces the early treatment of 
inherent anticipation by the Supreme Court, as well as the Federal 
Circuit and its predecessor court. Next, it argues that the Federal 
Circuit’s more recent inherency jurisprudence has expanded the scope of 
inherency, particularly with respect to patents covering pharmaceuticals, 
introducing dangerous and costly unpredictability into the patent system. 
Finally, it proposes a common-sense solution aimed at abrogating the 
current boundless conception of inherency in order to allow patent law 
and inherency to perform their central functions: to provide 
predictability and ensure the important patent policy of rewarding new 
inventions that are not already within the public domain. 
